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Non Technical Summary
In view of the increasing importance of social assistance in the presence of
rising long term unemployment, the question has been raised how effective
social assistance programs are in achieving their goals of alleviating poverty and
insecurity of existence. In this respect, apart from conditions for eligibility and
duration of benefits, the degree of centralisation of the administrative set-ups has
been discussed as one of the major issues responsible for differences in the
distributive impacts the systems produce. 
In this paper, the relationship between the degree of centralisation in
European schemes of social assistance and their success in alleviating poverty is
investigated. We start by presenting the two most frequently discussed
hypotheses concerning the relationship between centralisation of social security
systems and distributive outcomes in socio-economic literature: the first
concerns the issue whether more centralised systems concur with more
redistribution, whereas the second relates to the presumption that more
decentralised systems are more efficient in redistribution.
We then summarise some of the major characteristics relating to issues of
centralisation in European schemes of social assistance and introduce a set of
indicators suitable for operationalising these features for quantitative analysis.
Employing these indicators as input variables, several cluster analyses are
conducted to classify the EU15 schemes of social assistance according to their
similarity with respect to aspects of centralisation, and by means of
multidimensional scaling techniques an indicator of centralisation is developed.
By means of cluster analyses, we identify three broad categories of countries
exhibiting a high, medium and comparatively low degree of centralisation,
respectively. Apart from Greece and Portugal, where no nationwide system of
social assistance existed in 1995, UK, Ireland and the Netherlands are classified
as highly centralised, Belgium, Denmark, France and Finland as medium
centralised and the remaining countries as comparatively highly decentralised.
Employing the indicators as input variables for multidimensional scaling, a
scaling of countries according to their degree of centralisation is developed that
concurs with the classification obtained through cluster analyses.
Subsequently, after defining and explaining the concepts of distributive
effectiveness and efficiency, on the basis of Luxembourg Income Study data for
five selected EU countries an empirical analysis of poverty effectiveness and
efficiency using several measures of poverty is carried out. Concerning
effectiveness, the results show the highest influence of social assistance for the
UK, whereas the Italian social assistance scheme does not perform well in
reducing poverty. When taking the expenditures for social assistance benefits
into account, we observe a different picture: the UK falls back to the next to last
position for all poverty measures applied. Italy remains on one of the last
positions, whereas France occupies the top position for three out of four poverty
measures now. If housing benefits are included, France cannot hold its first
place for efficiency because of the comparably high budget for housing benefits.
Finally, in the light of the results from classifications and empirical analysis
the relationship between the systems’ degree of centralisation and their success
in alleviating poverty is evaluated. Concerning effectiveness in poverty
alleviation, the results provide some evidence that extremely centralised systems
are more effective with regard to redistribution than extremely decentralised
schemes. However, for systems with a medium degree of centralisation, the
hypothesis that greater decentralisation leads to more effectiveness is not
supported. With respect to efficiency, no support is lent to the hypothesis that a
higher degree of decentralisation is accompanied by a better distributive
efficiency. Rather, the results seem to suggest that systems with a medium
degree of decentralisation do better than either extremely centralised or
extremely decentralised systems.
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11 Introduction
The interest in means-tested social assistance has grown considerably when
rising unemployment rates in Europe in the first half of the 1990s caused a
higher number of social assistance recipients. Social assistance is closely
connected to other transfer payments because the end of eligibility for other
transfers such as unemployment assistance often leads to eligibility for social
assistance as a last safety net in social security systems. Thus, with growing
numbers of unemployed social assistance has also gained importance. But how
can social assistance be defined? An unambiguous international definition for
social assistance does not exist, so we have to accept a definition here which
suits our purposes. Eardley et al. (1996a) suggest a categorisation which
comprises the following three types of social assistance: (1) general assistance
which provides all or almost all people below a specified minimum income with
cash benefits, (2) categorical assistance which includes cash benefits for
specific groups like the unemployed, and (3) tied assistance which covers
specific goods or services in kind or cash like housing benefits. In the following,
when mentioning social assistance we refer to Eardley’s category of general
assistance. The second category is not covered by our investigation but we also
analyse the influence of housing benefits which are included in the third
category.
Heikkilä et al. (2001) name two key objectives of social assistance in an
international context: social assistance should prevent from extreme material
deprivation as well as social exclusion and marginalisation in order to maintain
the integration of the affected persons. Poverty alleviation therefore can be
considered as one of the major goals of social assistance schemes. In view of the
increasing importance of social assistance in the presence of rising long term
unemployment, the question arises how effective social assistance programs are
in achieving their goals of alleviating poverty and insecurity of existence. 
Until the seminal contribution of Esping-Anderson (1990), most empirical
work on distributive impacts of welfare programs had relied on comparing the
amount of social security expenditures with their distributive outcomes.
However, in view of the manifold nature of social assistance regulations, the
size of the social assistance budget alone is unlikely to explain the multifaceted
distributive impacts the systems produce. In particular, issues of conditions for
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2eligibility, duration of benefits and the degree of centralisation of the
administrative set-ups have been held responsible for differences in the
distributive impacts the systems produce.
In the present paper, we focus on the investigation of the relationship
between the degree of centralisation in European schemes of social assistance
and their success in achieving the goal of relieving poverty. For this purpose, we
start by presenting the most frequently discussed hypotheses concerning the
relationship between centralisation of social security systems and distributive
outcomes in socio-economic literature in section 2. Subsequently, in section 3
some of the major characteristics relating to issues of centralisation in European
schemes of social assistance are summarised and a set of indicators suitable for
operationalising these features for quantitative analysis is introduced.
Employing these indicators as input variables, several cluster analyses are
conducted to classify the European schemes of social assistance according to
their similarity with respect to aspects of centralisation, and by means of
multidimensional scaling techniques an indicator of centralisation is developed.
In section 4, after defining and explaining the concepts of distributive
effectiveness and efficiency, an empirical analysis of the impact of social
assistance benefits on income poverty in five selected EU countries is presented.
On the basis of Luxembourg Income Study data the effectiveness and efficiency
in reducing poverty are calculated for various measures of poverty. In section 5,
the linkage between the differences in centralisation and the distributive
outcomes is investigated, and the hypotheses presented in section 2 are
discussed in the light of these results. 
2 Poverty Reduction and the Degree of Centralisation:
Some Hypotheses
In socio-economic literature, the differences in distributive effectiveness and
efficiency of social transfer systems found in empirical investigations were
discussed at length and various arguments were put forward with respect to their
possible causes. With regard to the special case of social assistance, there are
important differences between countries in the way they organise the
administration and deliver social assistance benefits. These differences concern
the degree of centralisation, the extent of family obligations, the toughness of
3means-testing and the extent to which benefits are a legal entitlement. In the
present paper, we focus on the relationship of the distributive impacts and the
degree of centralisation in systems of social assistance.
Concerning the issue of centralised versus decentralised systems, as an
argument in favour of decentralised systems, the point was made that because of
informational asymmetries, decentralised systems are more efficient in
allocating benefits to those in need. In order to allocate benefits efficiently, the
legal authority must be able to distinguish between the poor and the less poor
applicants. For this purpose, knowledge of individual characteristics of single
cases is necessary. It is natural to assume that local authorities are better
informed which citizens are truly poor and are more familiar with social control
mechanisms within the community than the central state, even if the central
government sends employees on the location in order to collect the information
required. Especially in the presence of means tests, which are common in
systems of social assistance, a lower degree of centralisation should therefore
enable a better directed allocation of benefits to those in need. Accordingly,
poverty reduction should be accomplished more efficiently in more
decentralised systems.
Conversely, it is frequently argued that decentralised decisions on social
security programs can cause problems because of a migration externality: a
local authority that pays higher benefit levels than other authorities tends to
attract benefit recipients from other regions. This leads to a reduction of tax
burdens in those other regions and an overburdening of the more generous
region’s fiscal budget, which in turn will eventually force it to cut benefit levels
as well. Because of this migration externality, the degree of redistribution will
be inefficiently low when judged from a welfare theoretical perspective. The
hypothesis is thus that more centralised systems are more effective with regard
to redistribution. Additionally, the point was made that more centralised systems
produce more favourable results for socially disadvantaged groups, as they are
more likely to withstand the opposition of the better-off lobby groups.
In summary, from the arguments just presented there are two sets of
hypotheses that ought to be examined with regard to the relationship of
redistribution and the degree of centralisation: the first concerns the issue
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4whether more centralised systems concur with more redistribution, whereas the
second relates to the hypothesis that more decentralised systems are more
efficient in redistribution.
3 Degrees of Centralisation in European Social
Assistance Schemes
3.1 Features of Centralisation in EU Social Assistance Schemes
To examine the relationship between distributive impacts and the degree of
centralisation, we develop a system of classification suitable for grouping the
systems into several classes according to specific features related to
centralisation. While in socio-economic literature several attempts were made to
classify welfare states in general,7 only a few studies focused on the systems of
social assistance specifically, the most notable being Gough et al. (1997) and
Gough (2001). To our knowledge, however, only one study employed
quantitative methods for the development of classifications and none did any
investigation focus on attributes relating to centralisation. 
To form the basis for an empirical investigation of the hypotheses mentioned
above, the administrative settings, regulations concerning funding liabilities, and
decision responsibilities of the European schemes of social assistance in the
EU15 countries except for Luxembourg, which had to be excluded for reasons
of data availability, are investigated. Drawing on Eardley et al. (1996a, 1996b)
and Gough et al. (1997), the main characteristics of the schemes investigated
may be briefly summarised as follows (all information refers to the reporting
year of 1995).
In Austria, social assistance is the sole responsibility of the provinces. Rules
of eligibility as well as benefit levels vary between them. In general, there are no
uniform procedures, and the granting of claims is highly discretionary. District
authorities have further discretionary power: even if there are provincial
regulations, these rules tend to provide only a broad framework within which
district authorities are free to operate. There are no national benefit rates, but
due to provincial settings there are nine different benefit levels.
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5In Belgium, funding of social assistance is provided half by national tax
revenue and half by the municipalities. All minimum benefits have a national
statutory framework. However, in some cases financial pressure on the poorer
local authorities with the highest number of claimants has resulted in
geographical inequalities in the treatment of applicants. 
In Denmark the overall policy responsibility for social assistance lies with
the central government. It is administrated by the municipalities which have to
operate within the guidelines set by the central government. Rates of social
assistance have been fixed nationally. Municipalities retain an important element
of discretion concerning specific one-off expenditure payments, but discretion
has been reduced steadily with an increasing number of central directives on
eligibility and benefit levels. 
In Finland, social assistance is administrated by municipal offices within
general guidelines for conditions of eligibility set by the central government.
Since the early 1990s, pressure from increasing unemployment has led to the
abolition of many of the normative directives, leading to greater municipal
discretion and increasing variation of treatment. As a result, in some locations
there are more rigid enforcement and compliance procedures. Benefit levels are
set nationally for two geographical categories according to cost of living, which
differed by 4.4 percent in 1993. 
In France, the principal assistance benefit for people of working age, the
“Revenu Minimum d’Insertion” (RMI), is nationally regulated and mostly
funded from the central state. Supplementary benefits for invalids etc. which are
partly financed by contributions are delivered by local authorities. Theoretically
benefits are not subject to administrative discretion and there is no variation in
the amounts paid between the regions with the exception of overseas
departments. 
In Germany, social assistance is funded to 75 percent by municipalities and
to 25 percent by the central government. Policy responsibility is held at the
federal level, but the implementation is delegated to the Länder. Those in turn
can delegate part of the administration to the district and municipal authorities,
who have some discretionary powers. Benefit rates are set by the Länder within
a narrow band fixed by federal law. 
In Greece, there is no general, comprehensive scheme of social assistance
but rather a number of categorical social assistance type provisions, which are
characterised by fragmentation. There is no set of common criteria applying to
the provision of benefits. Policy responsibility for most of the schemes is
6exercised at a central level. Implementation is exercised at a regional level by
the Prefectures.
In Ireland, national regulations set by the central government apply to all
social assistance schemes, although local authorities have a limited degree of
discretionary power. Rates of payments are set nationally by parliamentary
decisions.
In Italy, there is no national system of social assistance, but only particular
national means-tested programs for older and disabled people, coupled with
local assistance schemes. The regions are permitted but not required to establish
general frameworks for social assistance, and the extent to which they do varies
markedly. Almost all benefits are administrated locally and there are substantial
variations between regions. 
In the Netherlands, social assistance is funded to 80 percent by the central
government. Regulations are set nationally, and policy responsibility is held by
the central state. Administration is on a municipal basis exercised by social
welfare departments. Benefits are standard national rates linked to the net
minimum wage. New legislation that gives greater discretion came into effect in
1996. 
In Portugal, no general system of social assistance existed in 1995. Instead,
there are certain categorical benefits that resemble what is generally accepted to
be social assistance (e.g. for invalids, elderly and orphans). For these categorical
benefits, all rates are set nationally and administration is carried out by regional
authorities. 
In Spain, apart from a number of categorical benefits for specific groups
(unemployed, elderly, invalids) there is a general minimum income scheme
which is available to people of working age but is implemented in different
ways by different regions. Regions set their own social assistance levels and
benefit rates vary substantially between them. 
In Sweden, most of the expenditures on social assistance is funded by local
authorities. Social assistance is a general right to support, but the scheme is
administered at a local level. Guidelines for the conditions of entitlement are set
by the central government, but the responsibility for the interpretation and
delivery of benefits remains with the municipality. There are nationally
recommended standard rates, but actual rates may be quite different in different
areas.
In the UK, social assistance is an integrated, nationally funded scheme with
common rules of eligibility and common levels of payments. The basic
7framework of social assistance is regulated by national law. The administration
is largely carried out by the central government and through the Benefits
Agency (BA) via its district offices. There is no discretionary of geographical
variation in normal benefit rates in the UK. 
3.2 A Classification of EU Social Assistance Schemes According to
Centralisation
From the characterisation above it may be inferred that the main differences
relate to the funding shares of the various federal levels, the assignment of
formal decision competencies and the degree of uniformity of benefit levels over
the nation state. Accordingly, using data from MISSOC (1995) and Eardley et
al. (1996b), for the purpose of investigation we introduce a set of three
indicators designed to depict the following features of social assistance schemes
relating to centralisation:	
 An indicator for funding liabilities: This indicator is designed to capture the
degree to which social assistance expenditures are financed by the central
government, by regional authorities or federal states, or by the local
authorities. 
 An indicator for formal decision responsibilities: This indicator is
constructed on the basis of information on the federal level at which basic-
rate benefits are established (central government, federal states or regional
authorities, local authorities).
 An indicator for regional differences in benefit levels: This indicator is
designed to account for the degree to which benefit levels actually vary
between regions.
In establishing classifications of welfare systems, quantitative methods were
rarely employed. This is mainly due to the fact that statistical inference is
impeded by the small number of observations that do not permit any sensible
regression analysis. Instead, several heuristic and semi-quantitative
investigations have been conducted. However, with all purely qualitative
assessments there is the danger of misjudging class assignments by overvaluing
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8highly conspicuous features on the cost of less obtrusive traits. A quantitative
analysis of class assignments is therefore highly desirable. 
As Kangas (1994) and Gough (2001) have suggested, cluster analysis may
be the method of choice to determine class assignments in cases where
regression analysis must be ruled out for lack of observations. Cluster analysis is
a descriptive instrument of explorative data analysis designed to identify
“natural groupings” of cases by simultaneously comparing multiple
characteristics depicted by a set of input variables. To this end, measures of
distances for the values of the input variables are computed. Subsequently,
grouping algorithms are employed to classify the cases into groups. In so-called
hierarchical methods, which are employed in the present investigation, the
algorithm proceeds by a series of successive mergers, starting with individual
objects and grouping them according to their similarities.
As cluster analysis is a tool of descriptive statistics, sources of error and
variation are not formally considered. To check for the stability of the results,
various clustering methods based on different distance measures and grouping
algorithms should be conducted. In the present investigation, average linkage,
Ward linkage and median linkage with quadratic Euclidean distances as well as
average linkage with Minkowski(1) distances are run. As in cluster analysis
different scales of measurement may greatly affect the results, all variables are
normalised to the range of [0;1].13 The analyses are conducted for the EU15
countries with the exception of Luxembourg that had to be excluded for reasons
of data availability. As the reporting year, also for reasons of data availability
with respect to the complementary empirical investigation presented in section 4
the year 1995 is chosen.
The results of cluster analyses are best illustrated graphically by so-called
dendrograms. In these tree-diagrams, the clusters are represented by branches
that merge together when junctions of clusters occur. The positions of these
mergers along the distance axis indicate the level of the aggregate distance value
at which cases are grouped together: mergers close to the left hand side of the
                                                          
 Cf. e.g. Johnson/Wichern 2002.
 Strictly speaking, this only applies for the so-called agglomerative hierarchical clustering
methods. The (less common) divisive methods proceed by starting from a single cluster
including all objects and successively assigning the cases to subgroups according to their
dissimilarities.
 For technical details on these measures, see e.g. Johnson/Wichern 2002.
 Since the Ward algorithm is based on the presence of differences in variances, which are
cancelled out by the more common z-standardisation, the [0;1] standardisation is preferred.
 Cf. e.g. Johnson/Wichern 2002.
9dendrogram indicate that the respective countries are very similar, whereas
mergers close to the right point to considerable dissimilarities. Accordingly,
with respect to the case list on the left hand side of the diagram, cases are listed
according to their similarity: countries exhibiting very similar characteristics are
listed close to each other, whereas more differing countries appear further apart
in the list. Consequently, from the successive junctions of the branches,
groupings and sub-groupings exhibiting different levels of homogeneity may be
identified. 
Running the above mentioned four different methods of cluster analysis we
obtain the dendrograms shown in figure 1a to 1d:
Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine
  C A S E    0         5        10        15        20        25
  Label  Num  +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+
  IR      10   
  UK      14   
  NL      11    
  DK       4    
  F        7         
  B        2        
  FI       8          
  E        5                                                 
  I        9                                               
  D        3                                           
  SE      13                                                 
  A        1                                                
  EL       6   
  P       12   
Figure 1a: Dendrogram, Average Linkage, Quadratic Euclidian Distance
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  P       12   
Figure 1b: Dendrogram, Average Linkage, Minkowski(1) Distance
Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine
  C A S E    0         5        10        15        20        25
  Label  Num  +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+
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  UK      14   
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  F        7               
  B        2              
  FI       8                
  E        5                                                 
  I        9                                                 
  D        3                                    
  SE      13                                                  
  A        1                                                  
  EL       6   
  P       12   
Figure 1c: Dendrogram, Ward Method, Quadratic Euclidian Distance
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Figure 1d: Dendrogram, Median Linkage, Quadratic Euclidian Distance
As the dendrograms show, with respect to their degree of centralisation we may
distinguish three broad categories of systems (apart from Greece and Portugal,
where no nationwide system of social assistance existed in the reporting year
1995):
 The first group showing a comparatively high degree of decentralisation
comprises Germany, Sweden, Spain, Italy and Austria. In these countries,
benefits are funded by municipalities, benefit levels are established by
regional or local authorities and vary across regions.
 In the second group, we find Belgium, Denmark, France and Finland. In these
countries, benefit levels are set by the central government and are largely
uniform across regions. Funding, however, is provided by regional or local
authorities.
 The third group, which features the highest degree of centralisation, consists
of Ireland, the United Kingdom, closely followed by the Netherlands. In these
countries, benefit levels are established by the central government and are
absolutely uniform across regions. In addition, benefits are funded (almost)
completely by the central state.
12
As we can see, apart from a few minor changes of position within the first
group, the obtained classifications prove valid for all clustering methods
employed. 
3.3 An Indicator of Centralisation for EU Social Assistance Schemes
The clear-cut results obtained by the cluster analyses suggest that an attempt
may be justified to construct an indicator of centralisation by employing the
above mentioned variables as an input for methods of multidimensional scaling
(MDS). In contrast to cluster analysis the primary objective of MDS is to project
the original multidimensional data into a co-ordinate system of less dimensions,
such that any distortion through the reduction in dimensionality is minimised.
Specifically, MDS techniques deal with the problem of finding a representation
of the N cases investigated in few dimensions for a set of observed distances
between every pair of the cases, such that the inter-item proximities match the
original distances as closely as possible. If the actual magnitudes of the original
distances are used to obtain the lower dimensional representation, the method is
called metric MDS. In the case of ordinal data it is also possible to arrange the
N cases using only the rank orders of the original distances but not their
magnitudes. This method is referred to as nonmetric MDS. 
MDS techniques are calculated by various methods of algorithms that differ
with respect to the distance measures employed and the loss function to be
minimised. The loss function is defined with respect to a numerical measure of
closeness to the original distances, which is called STRESS (STandardised
REsidual Sum of Squares). Several measures relating to STRESS were proposed
that differ mainly with respect to the manner deviations of proximities and
original distances are introduced. The most common measures are STRESS(1)
and STRESS(2) as defined by Kruskal and SSTRESS as defined by Takane,
Young et al.
 In general, STRESS values below 0.05 are considered as a good,
values below 0.025 as an excellent goodness of fit. 
                                                          
 Cf. Johnson/Wichern 2002. This variant of MDS is also known as principal component
analysis.
 Cf. Johnson/Wichern 2002.
 For a formal definition of these measures we refer to Johnson/Wichern 2002.
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For the present investigation, since part of the variables cannot be considered
as metric in a strict sense, nonmetric MDS is employed.18 Results are calculated
by means of two different algorithms, ALSCAL and PROXSCAL, and in each
case two different measures of distance, Euclidean distance and Minkowski(1)
distance are used.	 Since MDS is chosen for the purpose of developing an
indicator of centralisation, a reduction of dimensionality to one dimension is
predetermined. The results of the four MDS techniques employed are listed in
table 1 below:
PROXSCAL
(Euclidean
Distance)
PROCSCAL
(Minkowski(1)
Distance)
ALSCAL
(Euclidean
Distance)
ALSCAL
(Minkowski(1)
Distance)
IR -0.355 IR -0.351 IR -0.9911 IR -1.0036
UK -0.355 UK -0.351 UK -0.9906 UK -1.0036
NL -0.337 NL -0.335 NL -0.9205 NL -0.9307
B -0.305 B -0.309 B -0.6631 DK -0.6587
DK -0.305 DK -0.309 DK -0.6630 F -0.6587
F -0.305 F -0.309 F -0.6626 B -0.6586
FI -0.292 FI -0.293 FI -0.5594 FI -0.5466
D -0.253 D -0.256 D -0.0884 D -0.0944
A -0.229 A -0.230 A 0.2238 A 0.1939
SE -0.217 SE -0.214 SE 0.2369 SE 0.2621
I -0.196 I -0.192 I 0.3521 I 0.3710
E -0.179 E -0.178 E 0.4572 E 0.4756
P 1.663 P 1.663 P 2.1343 P 2.1261
EL 1.664 EL 1.664 EL 2.1344 EL 2.1261
STRESS I 0.00736 0.00664 0.04917 0.04284
STRESS II 0.00891 0.00804
SSTRESS 0.00000 0.00000 0.01543 0.01112
Table 1: Results of nonmetric MDS
As can be seen in table 1, the results of the MDS analyses correspond with the
classification obtained by the cluster analyses above. In all cases, the STRESS
figures obtained indicate a good to excellent goodness of fit. 
                                                          
	 Results for metric MDS have also been calculated as an experiment for comparison. While
different absolute values of the indicator resulted, rank orders obtained by nonmetric MDS
proved stable in the case of metric MDS as well.

 For technical and mathematical details on the algorithms used, see
http://www.spss.com/tech/stat/algorithms/11.0/proxscal.pdf and
http://www.spss.com/tech/stat/algorithms/11.0/alscal.pdf 
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The figures given in table 1 show the highest degree of centralisation for
Ireland and the UK, followed closely by the Netherlands. In the upper middle
group with a notable distance we find Belgium, Denmark, France and Finland
which also constitute a separate group in the results of cluster analyses, followed
by Germany, Sweden, Austria, Italy and Spain. Finally, Greece and Portugal
with no nationwide system of social assistance in 1995 are listed at the bottom
of the scale. With the exception of a single shift in rank orders between Belgium
and Denmark/France in the ALSCAL-Minkowski(1) scale, all scales exhibit
identical ranking of the systems. 
4 Impacts of Social Assistance Payments on Poverty:
Empirical Analysis
4.1 Analysis of Poverty Reduction: Effectiveness and
Efficiency
We now turn to the empirical analysis of poverty reduction through social
assistance payments. When analysing impacts of social transfers on poverty, the
investigation is often limited to measuring the poverty of post-transfer income
distributions.20 As Castles and Mitchell (1992) pointed out, this approach does
not do justice to the problem of assessing the effectiveness of social transfers
with respect to poverty reduction. Especially when pre-transfer poverty varies
greatly, a mere comparison of post-transfer poverty may yield a badly
misleading image, as post-transfer poverty tells nothing about the magnitude by
which the initial poverty has been reduced. Rather, the initial, pre-transfer
poverty must be taken into account. As a consequence, the appropriate measure
for assessing the effectiveness of poverty reduction is the percentage reduction
of the poverty measure considered due to the payment of social assistance
benefits, which is commonly referred to as the redistribution effect. 
Effectiveness, however, is only one relevant dimension when comparing
poverty reduction across social transfer systems in different countries. As a rule,
we observe that the shares of social assistance expenditures in GDP vary
substantially between the countries considered. Poverty reduction should
therefore be judged in the light of the total amount of expenditure spent in social
                                                          
 Cf. e.g. Morris/Preston 1986, EUROSTAT/European Commission 2000 and EUROSTAT
2000a and 2000b where poverty measures were calculated for post-transfer income.
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transfers, an issue relating to the notion of distributive efficiency. A commonly
adopted approach to measure efficiency in this context was suggested by
Beckerman (1979a, 1979b). This approach is based on the aggregate poverty
gap, which is the sum of the individual income shortfalls from the poverty line,
and is thus limited to one poverty measure. As we want to enlarge our
investigation to different measures of poverty which are often used in poverty
analysis we suggest a set of measures of distributive efficiency that are
constructed as follows. Dividing the redistribution effect of the respective
poverty measure by the share of social assistance expenditure in GDP, we obtain
a measure of distributive efficiency that expresses the amount of poverty
reduction achieved by investing one percent of GDP in social assistance
expenditure.
One issue of interpretation concerning the idea of efficiency in the present
context should be noted. Analysis of distributive efficiency deals with the
question which income groups are beneficiaries of the social transfer payments.
Distributive efficiency must therefore be distinguished from administrative
efficiency, which deals with the question which share of the transfers actually
reaches the recipients, rather than getting lost in the administrative process.
Likewise, distributive efficiency has to be distinguished from allocative
efficiency. In the latter case, adverse effects of social transfers on labour supply,
savings behaviour and the trade off between equality and efficiency in general
are the main areas of concern. We caution that distributive efficiency is an
efficiency measure in the classical sense of relating outcome (poverty reduction)
to input (social assistance expenditures) and tells nothing about the quality of
social assistance schemes with respect to Pareto efficiency or other welfare
economic concepts. 
4.2 Data and Methodological Issues
The impact of social assistance benefits on poverty in selected European
countries can be analysed on the basis of Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data.
The LIS database is a collection of harmonised household income surveys which
                                                          
 More specifically, the figure obtained is a measure of average efficiency. Of course, for
issues of interpretation the possibility must be considered that poverty reduction may be
subject to increasing marginal costs. 
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permit comparative studies for different countries. The latest available LIS
data are included in wave IV which refers to 1994/95. For these years, the usable
data refer to France, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom and Finland.
The relevant definition for disposable income (dpi) used here is the yearly
disposable income as defined by LIS, net of pensions. Furthermore, we apply
the concept of equivalent household income. This concept makes it possible to
compare households of different sizes by dividing household income by the
equivalent number of household members which is calculated applying an
equivalence scale. This household equivalent income is then assigned to each
household member. Thus, economies of scale due to fixed costs in household
consumption are taken into account.
The notion of poverty has manifold faces and can be captured by different
concepts. We limit our analysis to a relative definition of income poverty: a
unit of analysis is poor if its income lies below a certain percentage of median
adjusted disposable income. We apply a poverty threshold of 50 percent of
median equivalent income (referred to as median in the following) which is
commonly used in empirical research. As this percentage of the median is a
relatively arbitrary choice, for comparison we also apply an additional poverty
line of 60 percent of the median
 to check for the stability of the results. The
following discussion of the results refers to the poverty threshold of 50 percent
of the median; the results for the 60 percent of the median threshold are
mentioned only if the resulting rank order of countries is affected.28
When capturing poverty, two different aspects are of interest: first the
incidence and second the intensity of poverty. The incidence of poverty deals
with the question how many poor we find in a population, whereas the intensity
of poverty points out how far the income of the poor is below the minimum
threshold for the particular society.
                                                          
 For more information on the LIS data see http://www.lisproject.org and e.g. Smeeding
2002.
 See for definition of disposable income http://www.lisproject.org/techdoc/summary.pdf. 
 The equivalence scale employed here is the square root of the household size. Cf. e.g.
Buhmann et al. 1988, Biewen 2000: 3f, Atkinson/Rainwater/Smeeding 1995: 18ff for
further information on equivalence scales.
 For concepts of poverty see e.g. Scheurle 1991 or Förster 1994 and for more information
about other possibilities of defining a poverty line see e.g. Hagenaars 1986.
 See e.g. Förster 2000: 66 or Krämer 1997: 12 who state that 50 percent of median is a
standard threshold.
 This poverty line is used by EUROSTAT, see e.g. EUROSTAT 2000b.
	 The detailed results for the poverty line of 60 percent of the median are included in
Appendix C.
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As has been noted throughout the literature, different measures of poverty
may assess a given income distribution differently. Accordingly, in order to
obtain a reasonable picture, four different poverty measures have been applied.	
Most common is the headcount ratio which is a measure of the incidence of
poverty as it gives the share of poor in the considered population. The headcount
ratio is reported for the sake of completeness because it is the most popular
measure of poverty. However, we caution that this measure is of limited value
when judging the impacts of benefits on poverty alleviation, since it does not
evaluate the extent to which incomes fall below the poverty line in the pre- and
post-transfer situation. This aspect is taken into account by the three other
measures used, the poverty gap ratio (PGR), the measure FGT2 and the Sen
index of poverty, which focus on the intensity of poverty. The PGR is based on
the aggregate poverty gap which is the sum of the individual income shortfalls
from the poverty line. The PGR gives the ratio of the actual aggregate poverty
gap of the analysed income distribution and the maximum aggregate poverty
gap that would result if all incomes were zero. The third measure employed is
FGT2 which implies a higher sensitivity to high poverty gaps than the other
mentioned measures as it gives the average squared normalised poverty gap.
Finally, the poverty index of Sen (1976) is applied. It captures not only the
incidence and intensity but also the inequality of the income distribution of the
poor. 
To take differences in social assistance budgets into account, apart from the
redistribution effect as a measure of effectiveness the corresponding figures for
distributive efficiency as defined in section 4.1 are calculated. Unfortunately,
reliable data on social assistance expenditures suitable for inter-country
comparisons are unavailable for the reporting year of 1995. Accordingly, data
provided by Gough et al. (1997) referring to the reporting year of 1992 had to be
employed. Consequently, we caution that the efficiency figures calculated are
                                                          

 For more information about the measures applied see e.g. Foster et al. 1984, Seidl 1988 or
Hagenaars 1986 and Appendix B.
 FGT2 is a special case of the Foster/Greer/Thorbecke family of measures which is
characterised by a parameter  that indicates the sensitivity in the lowest income regions:
=0 is the headcount ratio, =1 is the PGR and =2 indicates the highest sensibility in the
lowest income regions of these three measures. See Appendix B for more details.
 Data provided by regularly published EUROSTAT statistics do not include the category of
social assistance as defined by MISSOC, but only a subcategory named „social exclusion“
which is not congruent with the notion of social assistance used here. In MISSOC, by
contrast, data on social assistance expenditure are unavailable for Italy, while for some of
the remaining countries only estimates referring to different reporting years are provided.
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not to be taken as an exact measure of distributive efficiency but rather as an
indicator variable that points to the relative efficiency of the social assistance
schemes considered.
In most countries, housing benefits are granted as a supplement to social
assistance payments. However, since the degree of integration of housing
benefits with social assistance as well as housing costs varies across countries,
excluding housing benefits from the analysis may distort comparisons.
Accordingly, to complete the picture, impacts on poverty of social assistance
plus housing benefits are also calculated for the poverty line of half of the
median and compared to the results obtained for social assistance payments
alone.
4.3 Results on Distributive Effectiveness and Efficiency
To analyse the impact of social assistance on poverty, the four measures
presented above are calculated for disposable income and disposable income
less social assistance for each country. As we intend to investigate the influence
of social assistance on poverty, we apply the poverty line calculated for
disposable income also for disposable income less social assistance. In order to
compare the effects of social assistance in the different countries, the percentage
reduction of the values of the applied measures for disposable income less social
assistance to disposable income is computed. The results obtained are shown in
figure 2 a to 2 d:
Figure 2 a: Percentage reduction headcount Figure 2 b: Percentage reduction PGR
ratio
                                                          
 Cf. Gough et al. 1997: 20.
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Figure 2 c: Percentage reduction FGT2 Figure 2 d: Percentage reduction Sen index
The diagrams show that in the UK social assistance has clearly the strongest
impact on poverty values for all measures investigated. The rank positions of the
other countries depend on the poverty measure applied: the PGR, FGT2 and the
Sen index all give an unambiguous ranking with Germany showing the second
highest reduction numbers, followed by France, Finland and last Italy. The
headcount ratio gives a different picture with Finland on the second best place
followed by Germany, France and Italy. Since the headcount ratio is the only
measure that takes into account merely the incidence but not the intensity of
poverty, it may be inferred from these results that the French and German
systems are more effective in the reduction of intense poverty than the Finish
system.
The results described above take only account of the percentage reduction of
poverty after social assistance. They neglect the fact that this poverty reduction
is obtained at different expenditure levels for this transfer. Changing the focus
from distributive effectiveness to efficiency of social assistance by dividing the
percentage reduction as defined above by the share of social assistance
expenditures in GDP, we obtain the results displayed in figure 3 a to 3 d:
                                                          
 As noted above, as suitable data on social assistance expenditures are unavailable for the
reporting year of 1995, the data provided by Gough et al. (1997) referring to the reporting
year of 1992 had to be employed. Specifically, the data provided under the category [1]:
General Assistance in Gough et al. (1997) were employed for calculations on social
assistance alone. For calculations including housing benefits expenditures listed in
category [3]: Housing Assistance were added. Cf. Gough et al 1997: 25.
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Figure 3 a: Efficiency values headcount Figure 3 b: Efficiency values PGR
ratio
Figure 3 c: Efficiency values FGT2 Figure 3 d: Efficiency values Sen index
We find that taking the social assistance budget into account considerably
changes the rank positions of the countries, depending on the measure applied.
The PGR, FGT2 and the Sen index yield quite similar results. France, that
took the third position with respect to effectiveness performs best for efficiency
which reflects its low expenditures for social assistance. The second position is
held by Germany. For the remaining countries PGR and the Sen index result in
different ranks than FGT2: with the PGR and the Sen index Finland is followed
by the UK and Italy, whereas FGT2 places Italy on the third, the UK on the
fourth and Finland on the last position. However, we caution that the efficiency
numbers for Finland, the UK and Italy are close together for all of these three
measures. For the sake of completeness, we add that efficiency calculations
based on the headcount ratio show different ranks for the countries: in this case,
Finland clearly performs best, while France, that holds the best position for the
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other applied measures, has the second best result followed by Germany, the UK
and Italy. As in the case of effectiveness, the vastly diverging results for Finland
(top position with headcount ratio, last position with FGT2) leads one to
suppose that the Finish system places more importance to reducing poverty
incidence than e.g. the French and German systems.
When applying the alternative poverty line of 60 percent of the median, we
find different results for FGT2 and the headcount ratio. The results for FGT2
show interchanged rank positions of Finland (third best now) and Italy that falls
back to the last place when compared with results for the 50 percent median
poverty line. With respect to the headcount ratio Italy and Germany switch
places which means that Germany is least efficient when judged with reference
to the 60 percent of median threshold. These variations in the rank orders are
quite understandable, since the efficiency numbers calculated with a threshold of
half of the median are also quite close together for these three countries. 
To summarise, it is clear that when taking the size of the social assistance
budget into account, the distributive impacts yield a very different picture. In
particular, considering the UK, the impressive results with respect to
effectiveness cannot compensate for the comparatively high social assistance
budget. By contrast, especially the French system with its lower expenditures for
social assistance improves its position when compared to the calculations for
effectiveness. Germany can hold its second position for the PGR, FGT2 and the
Sen index, but for the headcount ratio the picture is not that clear as the
application of the poverty threshold of 60 percent of the median yields different
results. Finland’s performance strongly depends on the measure applied: as in
the case of effectiveness results for the headcount ratio are considerably better
than the figures obtained for PGR, FGT2 and the Sen Index. With regard to
Italy, efficiency figures are the lowest with all measures except for FGT2,
pointing to the fact that the low level of social expenditure cannot compensate
for the weak results in distributive effectiveness.
The results of the calculations carried out for social assistance with and
without housing benefits34 are shown in direct comparison in table 2 and 3. 
                                                          
 This means that the effectiveness and efficiency figures are calculated on the basis of
disposable income less the sum of social assistance and housing benefits and the
expenditure figures for social assistance and housing benefits as indicated in table 2 and 3.
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France Italy Germany UK Finland
Headcount ratio
dpi – social
assistance
3.59 1.72 7.40 28.99 10.97
dpi – (social
assistance +
housing
benefits)
22.56 - 10.13 34.03 23.52
Poverty Gap Ratio
dpi – social
assistance
15.87 3.76 23.63 57.67 9.57
dpi – (social
assistance +
housing
benefits)
34.15 - 30.00 69.82 18.48
FGT2
dpi – social
assistance
24.61 5.61 32.75 66.00 9.65
dpi – (social
assistance +
housing
benefits)
42.96 - 41.32 80.65 16.42
Sen index
dpi – social
assistance
15.25 3.71 21.88 52.45 10.13
dpi – (social
assistance +
housing
benefits)
33.90 28.13 65.20 19.61
Table 2: Effectiveness measures for social assistance and housing benefits (poverty line half 
median)
dpi: disposable income
                                                          
 The variable including housing benefits is not available for Italy in the LIS dataset, since
only a few Italian regions provide specific housing benefits mainly for elderly people.
23
France Italy Germany UK Finland
Headcount ratio
dpi – social
assistance
17.93 8.60 14.80 11.60 27.42
dpi – (social
assistance +
housing
benefits)
22.56 - 14.48 9.20 -
Poverty Gap Ratio
dpi – social
assistance
79.33 18.80 47.26 23.07 23.91
dpi – (social
assistance +
housing
benefits)
34.15 - 42.85 18.87 -
FGT2
dpi – social
assistance
123.04 28.03 65.51 26.40 24.13
dpi – (social
assistance +
housing
benefits)
42.96 - 59.03 21.80 -
Sen index
dpi – social
assistance
76.26 18.53 43.77 20.98 25.33
dpi – (social
assistance +
housing
benefits)
33.90 - 40.19 17.62 -
Table 3: Efficiency measures for social assistance and housing benefits (poverty line half
median)
dpi: disposable income
As expected, the effectiveness figures are generally higher because an additional
transfer is included in the present calculations. With regard to the rank order, the
only change observable is the switching of positions of France and Germany for
all measures applied.
 This is probably due to the considerable difference in
recipient numbers for these benefits in the two countries: while in France 8.8
                                                          
 Expenditures for housing benefits are not available for Finland in Gough et al 1997.
 Unfortunately, data on the budget for housing benefits are not available for Finland. If they
were available and included, it is likely that the ranking for efficiency would differ a little
bit from the one we present here
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percent of the population receive housing benefits and 1.1 percent social
assistance benefits, in Germany 2.8 percent are recipients of housing benefits
and 4.5 percent receive social assistance.38 Consequently, effectiveness figures
in France are improved a lot more by adding housing benefits than this is the
case for Germany.
Considering the results for distributive efficiency, rank positions remain
unchanged in comparison to the case without housing benefits only for the
headcount ratio. By contrast, with respect to the other three measures, France
and Germany change places, implying that France no longer takes the top
position which is now held by Germany. The better performance in efficiency of
Germany may be explained by the low additional expenditures for housing
assistance, especially when comparing them to the French costs for housing
benefits, where expenditures are four times as high as the budget for social
assistance alone. The UK, where the expenditures for housing benefits are
higher than even the French costs for social assistance and housing benefits
taken together, keeps the position after Germany and France.
To summarise, the effectiveness and efficiency indicators based on FGT2,
the poverty gap ratio and the Sen index yield quite similar rankings of the
countries considered. The most remarkable differences appear for the headcount
ratio, which only records if someone is poor or not independently of the severity
of poverty. Thus, it is a very simple measure which does not register if a poor
receives social assistance but stays under the poverty line despite he or she could
improve his/her situation. The other applied measures all include these
differences and are therefore more appropriate to reflect the situation of the poor
in a society.
5 Reduction of Poverty and the Degree of Centralisation:
An Evaluation
The results just presented offer some interesting evidence with respect to the
hypotheses on the relationship between the degree of centralisation of social
assistance schemes and their impact on poverty alleviation. Let us first turn to
the relationship between centralisation and the extent to which redistribution
occurs. The relevant figure is the percentage reduction of initial poverty by
means of social assistance, i.e. the effectiveness of redistribution. As the figures
                                                          
	 Cf. Eardley et al. 1996a.
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in table 2 show, the rank order for all effectiveness measures with the exception
of the headcount ratio is UK, Finland, Germany, France and Italy, with the UK
achieving the highest and Italy the lowest effectiveness. When comparing these
results to the conclusions drawn from the cluster analyses and MDS, the
following picture appears. The UK that has clearly the most centralised system
within the five countries considered here, also achieves the highest figure with
regard to effectiveness. Conversely, Italy, that has the most decentralised
system, just as clearly exhibits the lowest effectiveness. The remaining countries
are listed quite closely together in the MDS scales, while in cluster analyses
Germany is found in a more decentralised group than Finland and France.
Accordingly, with respect to the hypothesis to be examined there is some
evidence that extremely centralised countries are more effective with regard to
redistribution than extremely decentralised countries. However, for systems with
a medium degree of centralisation (Germany, Finland, and France), the results
do not seem to support the hypothesis that greater centralisation leads to more
effectiveness, since Germany, that has the most decentralised system of the
three, has clearly the highest effectiveness figures for all measures with except
from the headcount ratio. 
Concerning efficiency, the picture is more complicated. It may be stated that
with all measures except for FGT2, the most centralised and the most
decentralised systems, UK and Italy, take the two last positions in the efficiency
ranking. The countries with a medium degree of centralisation, Finland, France,
and Germany seem to do better with regard to efficiency than either extremely
centralised or extremely decentralised systems. This applies for all measures
except for FGT2, where Italy performs better than either Finland or the UK.
Moreover, comparing France with the more decentralised German system, with
all measures investigated the French system performs more efficiently than the
German system. Accordingly, no support seems lent to the hypothesis that a
higher degree of decentralisation is accompanied by a better distributive
efficiency. Rather, the results seem to suggest that systems with a medium
degree of decentralisation do better with regard to efficiency than either
extremely centralised or extremely decentralised systems.
We wish to caution that in interpreting these results it must be borne in mind
that there are other differences in the set-up of the social assistance schemes
which may influence their effectiveness and efficiency in redistribution. In
particular, differences in regulations concerning degrees of coverage, conditions
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for eligibility and the like may cause differences in redistributive effects that are
only indirectly related to the degree of centralisation, if at all.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, the linkage between social assistance arrangements in the
European Union, their degree of centralisation and poverty effectiveness and
efficiency was examined. After presenting some prominent hypotheses on this
relationship and briefly summarising the main aspects relating to centralisation
in European schemes of social assistance, a set of indicators was introduced for
the purpose of operationalising characteristics of centralisation for quantitative
analyses. Subsequently, to classify the European schemes of social assistance
according to their degree of centralisation, these indicators were used as input
variables in several methods of cluster analyses and multidimensional scaling.
By means of cluster analyses, we identified three broad categories of countries
exhibiting a high, medium and comparatively low degree of centralisation,
respectively. Apart from Greece and Portugal, where no nationwide system of
social assistance existed in 1995, UK, Ireland and the Netherlands were
classified as highly centralised, Belgium, Denmark, France and Finland as
medium centralised and the remaining countries as comparatively highly
decentralised. Employing the indicators as input variables for multidimensional
scaling, a scaling of countries according to their degree of centralisation was
developed that concurs with the classification obtained through cluster analyses.
Subsequently, for five selected European countries an empirical analysis of
poverty effectiveness and efficiency using several measures of poverty was
carried out. Concerning effectiveness, the results showed the highest influence
of social assistance for the UK, whereas the Italian social assistance scheme
does not perform well in reducing poverty. When taking the expenditures for
social assistance benefits into account, we observe a different picture: the UK
falls back to the next to last position for all poverty measures applied. Italy
remains on one of the last positions, whereas France occupies the top position
for three out of four poverty measures now. If housing benefits are included,
France cannot hold its first place for efficiency because of the comparably high
budget for housing benefits.
Finally, in the light of the results from classifications and empirical analysis
the relationship between the systems’ degree of centralisation and their success
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in alleviating poverty was evaluated. Concerning effectiveness in poverty
alleviation, the results provide some evidence that extremely centralised systems
are more effective with regard to redistribution than extremely decentralised
schemes. However, for systems with a medium degree of centralisation, the
hypothesis that greater decentralisation leads to more effectiveness is not
supported. With respect to efficiency, no support is lent to the hypothesis that a
higher degree of decentralisation is accompanied by a better distributive
efficiency. Rather, the results seem to suggest that systems with a medium
degree of decentralisation do better than either extremely centralised or
extremely decentralised systems.
We have to remark here that there are other goals of social assistance
schemes besides reducing poverty. One other important objective is reducing
inequality.	 Perhaps even more important is the issue of social exclusion, which
is related to the presence of long-term unemployment, welfare dependency and
increasing social division. When interpreting results on redistributive
effectiveness and efficiency, a complementary investigation of social mobility
and social exclusion is therefore highly desirable.
                                                          

 This aspect was analysed in Hölsch/Kraus 2002 who stated that a medium degree of
centralisation is connected with better results in terms of efficiency.
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Appendix A: Indicators for Classification According to Degree of
Centralisation
The following indicators are used as input variables for the cluster analyses
concerning the degree of centralisation:
1. An indicator for funding liability:
This indicator captures the degree to which social assistance expenditures
are financed by the central government, by regional authorities/federal state
or by local authorities. For this purpose, three partial indicators are
constructed that recorded the percentage to which expenditures are funded
by the central government (I1), by regional authorities/federal states (I2) or
by local authorities (I3). The overall indicator (I) is calculated according to
the formula I=(3*I1 + 2*I2 + I3)/6.
2. An indicator for formal decision responsibility: 
This indicator reflects the federal level (central government, federal states
or regional authorities, local authorities) at which basic-rate benefits are
established. Using information from MISSOC (1995), countries are
classified into five categories and assigned the integer values 1 to 5,
depending on whether there was no nation wide system at all (1) or regular
benefit levels were established by local authorities (2), regional authorities
or federal states (3), local or regional authorities were bounded through
nationwide coordination (4) or benefit levels were established by the
central government (5).
3. An indicator for regional differences in benefit levels: 
This indicator captures the degree to which benefit levels actually vary
between regions. Data on the percentage variation are given in MISSOC
(1995) for all countries with the exception of Finland and Sweden, where
benefit levels differ regionally according to costs of living. For these two
countries, data refer to the information given in Eardley et al. 1996b. 
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The values of the indicator variables, normalised to [0;1], are given in the table
below. Countries are listed in descending order.
indicator for
funding liability
indicator for
formal decision
responsibility
indicator for
regional
differences in
benefit levels 
IR 1,00 B 1,00 B 1,00
UK 1,00 DK 1,00 DK 1,00
NL 0,93 F 1,00 F 1,00
B 0,67 FI 1,00 IR 1,00
DK 0,67 IR 1,00 NL 1,00
F 0,67 NL 1,00 UK 1,00
A 0,65 UK 1,00 D 0,95
FI 0,61 D 0,75 FI 0.95
D 0,42 SE 0,75 I 0.85
E 0,33 A 0,50 E 0.75
I 0,33 E 0,50 SE 0,70
SE 0,33 I 0,50 A 0,70
EL 0,00 EL 0,00 EL 0,00
P 0,00 P 0,00 P 0,00
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Appendix B: Poverty Measures
With
n number of households considered
q number of poor households considered
yi income of i-th household
µ arithmetic mean of income
z poverty line,
the headcount ratio is defined as
qH
n

The headcount ratio gives the share of households which are considered to be
poor. These households are reported as poor if their income lies under the
poverty line and it does not matter how poor they are. It is limited to a range of
[0;1].This measure is very simple and it has the disadvantage that it does not
measure the effect of transfers that do not lift poor households above the poverty
line. 
The poverty gap ratio (PGR) is defined as
q
i
i 1
(z y )
P
nz




It is based on the aggregate poverty gap which is calculated as 
q
i
i 1
(z y )

 . The
PGR gives the ratio of the actual aggregate poverty gap and the aggregate
poverty gap if all incomes were zero. Thus, this measure points out how poor a
unit of analysis is and not only if it is poor.
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The family of Foster/Greer/Thorbecke measures (FGT) is defined as
This family of measures was introduced by Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984).
They constructed it as additively decomposable under consideration of welfare
aspects. It gives a normalised weighted sum of the income shortfalls of the poor.
The parameter  is a “poverty aversion parameter”, its magnitude determines the
weight assigned to downward deviations from the poverty line. The higher the
value of , the higher the importance attributed to the “poorest of the poor”.
With =0, the headcount ratio is obtained which ignores the income shortfalls
completely, =1 results in the poverty gap ratio. The third applied measure in
this study is the FGT measure for =2 which indicates a higher sensitivity in the
lowest income regions than the other two measures.
The Sen index is defined as 
q
i
i 1
2S (z y )(q 1 i)
(q 1)nz

   


Sen (1976) introduced this index with the intention of capturing the aspects of
incidence, intensity and inequality of the income distribution of the poor in one
measure. This measure weights the income shortfalls with the rank orders of the
poor: the poorer someone is, the higher the weight attached to his income
shortfall. The Sen index can take on values in [0;1], where the lower bound of 0
applies in the case when all incomes are higher than the poverty line. The index
is sometimes criticised because it is not clear how much is contributed to the end
value by each of the three integrated aspects of poverty.
q q
i
i
i 1 i 1
z y1 1FGT (z y ) , 0
nz n z


 
 
 
 
 

     
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Appendix C: Results for Poverty Line 60 Percent of Median
France Italy Germany UK Finland
Headcount
ratio
1.71 1.28 2.60 14.15 8.87
PGR 10.66 2.89 16.31 45.80 9.78
FGT2 19.06 4.43 26.69 59.54 9.72
Sen index 10.95 2.88 16.06 42.38 9.33
Table A1: Poverty reduction figures for a poverty line of 60 percent of median
France Italy Germany UK Finland
Headcount
ratio
8.57 6.41 5.20 5.66 22.18
PGR 53.30 14.43 32.61 18.32 24.44
FGT2 95.28 22.15 53.38 23.82 24.30
Sen index 54.74 14.38 32.11 16.95 23.31
Table A2: Poverty efficiency figures for a poverty line of 60 percent of median
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